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Abstract. Civic Crowdfunding is emerging as a popular means to mo-
bilize funding from citizens for public projects. A popular mechanism de-
ployed on civic crowdfunding platforms is a provision point mechanism,
wherein, the total contributions must reach a predetermined threshold in
order for the project to be provisioned (undertaken). Such a mechanism
may have multiple equilibria; unfortunately, in many of these equilibria,
the project is not funded even if it is highly valued among the agents.
Recent work has proposed mechanisms with refund bonuses where the
project gets funded in equilibrium if its net value is higher than a thresh-
old among the agents who are aware of the crowdfunding effort. In this
paper, we formalize the notion of social desirability of a public project
and propose mechanisms which use the idea of referrals to expand the
pool of participants and achieve an equilibrium in which the project gets
funded if its net value exceeds a threshold among the entire agent popula-
tion. We call this new class of mechanisms Referral-Embedded Provision
Point Mechanisms (REPPM). We specifically propose two variants of
REPPM and both these mechanisms have the remarkable property that,
at equilibrium, referral bonuses are offered but there is no need for actual
payment of these bonuses. We establish that any given agent’s equilib-
rium strategy is to refer other agents and to contribute in proportion to
the agent’s true value for the project. By referring others to contribute,
an agent can, in fact, reduce his equilibrium contribution. In our view, the
proposed mechanisms will lead to an increase in the number of projects
that are funded on civic crowdfunding platforms.
1 Introduction
Civic crowdfunding platforms like Spacehive [1], Citizinvestor [11] and Neigh-
bourly [23] etc., aim to generate funding for public and community projects from
citizens. In the United Kingdom alone, Spacehive has generated £5 million for
over 150 public projects from citizen contributions across 68 cities. A typical
process that is followed in crowdfunding of public projects is as follows:
1. Requester posts a public project proposal : A requester, seeking crowdfunding
for a public project, posts a proposal. The proposal specifies a target amount
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Fig. 1. (a) Projects on a civic crowdfunding platform (b) Referrals can expand the set
of agents who can contribute.
of funds to be raised for the project to be provisioned: the target amount
is known as the provision point. The requester also specifies a deadline by
which the funds need to be raised.
2. Agents arrive: Agents arrive over time to view the project and observe (a) the
target amount, (b) the amount pending to be funded, and (c) the deadline.
3. Agents contribute: An agent may contribute any amount to the project.
4. Requester provisions or refunds: If the funding target is achieved by the
deadline, the requester provisions the project; otherwise, the contributions
of all agents are refunded.
We refer to this as the Provision Point Baseline (PPB) mechanism. The class
of Provision Point Mechanisms (PPM) we consider share the following charac-
teristics: (i) if the provision point is reached, the contributions are collected and
the project is provisioned and (ii) if provision point is not reached, the project
is not provisioned and the contributions are refunded; in addition, a bonus may
be paid to agents. In PPB, no bonus is offered or paid. In the Provision Point
Mechanism with Refund Bonus (PPR) [27] and Provision Point Mechanism with
Securities (PPS) [8], bonuses are offered to incentivize contributions. In this
work, we propose the class of Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms
(REPPM) and instantiate two mechanisms of this class: Referral-Embedded Pro-
vision Point Mechanism with Refund Bonus (REPP-R) and Referral-Embedded
Provision Point Mechanism with Securities (REPP-S).
2 Problem Statement, Related Work, Our Contributions
Problem Statement: Civic crowdfunding has had mixed results with only 44%
of posted projects getting funded[1]. An important question is to understand why
a project does not get funded. There are at least three distinct challenges:
1. Challenge-1: the project is not valued enough in the agent population it
is purported to benefit.
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2. Challenge-2: the project is valued enough by the agents but not all the
agents who value it were aware of the crowdfunding effort.
3. Challenge-3: the project is valued enough by the agents, all the agents
were aware of the crowdfunding effort, but some agents chose to free ride on
the contributions of others.
Challenge-3 may be attributed to the use of PPB mechanism which has been
shown to have multiple equilibria, in many of which the project is not funded
[6,7,25]. To solve Challenge-3, Zubrickas et.al [27] and Chandra et.al. [8] pro-
pose PPR and PPS respectively. Our current work is motivated by Challenge-
2 on crowdfunding platforms, where, a subtle yet critical distinction must be
made between the set of agents who value the public project (N) and the set of
agents who are aware of the crowdfunding effort (M). The set of agents who can
contribute is M ∩N (Figure 1(b)). To solve Challenge-2, one approach is to
use a referral mechanism to incentivize agents who are aware of the crowdfund-
ing effort to refer others who might value the project. With agents in a social
network, referral mechanisms can expand the pool of participants, thus increas-
ing the funds created through crowdfunding. This alone however may not be
sufficient; we need mechanisms which solve Challenge-2 and Challenge-3
together. This is the problem we address in this paper.
Challenges in Designing Referrals for Provision Point Mechanisms:
Our first challenge in introducing a referral mechanism in provision point mech-
anisms is to ensure that agents do not free-ride and do, in fact, contribute to the
public project. Note that, on its own, a referral mechanism increases the incen-
tive to free ride since an agent may rely on referral bonuses for gaining his utility.
Our second challenge is that, since the project is public (non-excludable, non-
rival), it is apriori unclear who would pay the referral bonus. In fact, no agent
may be willing to pay a referral bonus: this is a key difference with other referral
mechanisms in the literature where there exists a center (henceforth, sponsor)
who benefits from the referrals. Third, it is desirable that an agent’s referral
bonus is proportional to the contributions of his referrals and his equilibrium
contribution is proportional to his true value for the project (fairness).
Related Work in Crowdfunding: Our work is most closely related to the
work of Zubrickas et.al [27] and Chandra et.al. [8] which we discuss in detail
in Section 4. There is significant literature in the design of mechanisms for the
private provisioning of pubic projects [6,7,8,10,15,25,26,27]. In the voluntary con-
tribution mechanism (VCM), agents voluntarily contribute and the extent of the
public project provisioned corresponds to the aggregate funds collected. VCM
induces a simultaneous move game which has multiple equilibria and in many
of these equlibiria, the public project is not provisioned [17]. Morgan et. al. [21]
studies the use of state lotteries to incentivize contributions to public projects,
wherein, a higher contribution leads to a higher likelihood of winning: the game
induced attains a unique equilibrium which outperforms VCM. Marx et. al. [20]
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consider a setting where agents make repeated contributions in a round-robin
fashion and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium where an agent contributes
if and only if others have contributed their equilibrium contributions.
Related Work in Referral Mechanisms: Referral mechanisms have been
used in a wide variety of settings like the red balloon challenge [22,24], viral mar-
keting [2,5,9,13,14,19], and query propagation in social networks [12,18]. These
mechanisms may be classified based on whether the sponsor of the referral bonus
seeks to maximize the spread of information in the network (e.g. viral market-
ing) or find an (a set of) agent(s) to achieve an objective (e.g. red balloon, query
propagation). In either case, however, the sponsor pays out the referral bonus
contingent on some observable action or target being achieved.
Our Contributions: Our primary contribution is to design a class of mech-
anisms for civic crowdfunding of public projects which achieve an equilibrium
that is socially desirable(informally, there is enough value of the project to all
the agents) we define social desirability more formally later on (Definition 2)).
We call the proposed class of mechanisms Referral-Embedded Provision Point
Mechanisms (REPPM) and quantify the advantage of REPPM over PPM in
terms of social desirability. We instantiate two variants of REPPM: REPP-R
and REPP-S corresponding to PPR [27] and PPS [8] respectively. In both these
mechanisms, agents are incentivized to contribute using a refund bonus and are
incentivized to refer other agents to contribute using a referral bonus - the latter
relies on a Referral Bonus Function (RBF). In REPP-R, both the bonuses are
computed using a proportional scheme and in REPP-S, they are computed using
an underlying prediction market.
We believe that in the context of civic crowdfunding of public projects, our
work is the first to design a referral mechanism which offers a referral bonus that
incentivizes referrals but remarkably does not pay the referral bonus in equilib-
rium. Exploiting this, we show that if the agent population which will benefit
from the project forms a connected graph via social relations, our mechanisms
achieve an equilibrium where the project is funded (Theorem 2, Theorem 3). We
also show that an agent’s equilibrium contribution is proportional to the agent’s
value for the project, less a referral bonus which depends on the net contribu-
tions due to the agent’s referrals. We note that both PPR and PPS require a
sponsor who offers bonuses to incentivize contributions. A key advantage of our
approach is that it reduces the sponsor’s risk: this should make it easier to find
such sponsors and thus increase the success of civic crowdfunding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we set up the
notation that we use in the rest of the paper. In Section 4, we formalize the
notion of social desirability, introduce the notion of embedding a referral bonus
function in provision point mechanisms and specify the conditions that such
a function must satisfy to be used REPPM. In Section 5 and Section 6, we
instantiate REPPM corresponding to PPR and PPS and study the impact of
doing so on the equilibrium. We conclude in Section 7 with a summary.
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3 Notation, Setup, and Assumptions
Notation: Let N be the set of agents who value a given public project and let
M be the set of agents who are aware of the crowdfunding effort. Hence the set
of agents who can contribute funds to the project is M ∩N (See Figure 1(b)).
The value that agent i derives from the public project getting provisioned is θi
and the net value for the project among agents who can contribute is ϑM∩N =∑|M∩N |
i=1 θi. Let h
0 be the target amount that needs to be collected for the project
to be provisioned. Agent-i’s contribution is xi ∈ [0, h0] and the net contribution
is χ =
∑|M∩N |
i=1 xi. The vector of contributions is x = (x1, ..., x|M∩N |) ∈ R|M∩N |+ .
We use the subscript −i to represent all agents other than agent i, for example,
x−i refers to the vector of contributions of all agents except i. Agent i may refer
Mi ⊆ Ni other agents, where Ni is set of his neighbors in the social network.
In a sequential setting, at t = 0, the requester posts a proposal for funding a
public project. This includes the target amount of funds h0 (the provision point)
and a deadline T till which agents may contribute to the project. ht refers to
the target amount that remains to be collected at time t. Agent-i arrives at time
ai ∈ [0, T ] and observes the funds that have been collected so far (h0−hai). Agent
i may decide to contribute funds xi ∈ [0, hai ] at any time ti ∈ [ai, T ]. Thus, in
the sequential setting, agent i’s strategy, ψi, consists of his contribution (xi), his
time of contribution (ti) and the set of agents he refers (Mi) and his utility is
ui(ψ; θi). Table 2 (Appendix 8.1) summarizes key notation.
Fig. 2. (a) Agent’s contributions to projects; (b) Referral tree for P2 with agent types.
Agents in M ∩ N can be represented as a directed graph with the sponsor as
the root. If more than one agent refers the same agent, the earliest referral takes
precedence. Agents who contribute without being referred by another agent form
the sponsor’s single hop neighbors. Thus, the referral graph is a tree. Consider,
for example, the scenario in Figure 2(a) where three public projects are re-
questing funds from 12 agents (|N | = 12). An edge from an agent to a project
represents that the agent is aware of the effort (visited the project page). The
weight of the edge represents an agent’s contribution to the project: we use a
dotted edge to represent a contribution of value zero. For P2, M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
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are aware of the crowdfunding effort and have contributed; if agents {1, 3, 4, 5}
refer their neighbors, we get the referral tree of Figure 2(b).
We make the following assumptions. Assumption-1: Agents have quasi-
linear utility [6,8,27]. Assumption-2: Apart from knowing the history of con-
tributions, agents do not have any information regarding whether the project
will get funded or not [8,27]. Assumption-3 : The set of agents who have a
non-zero value for the project (N) forms a connected graph. Assumption-4: In
a sequential setting, agents contribute only once to the project (agents typically
visit the project website once and contribute if the project has value to them).
Our mechanisms ensure that agents have no advantage in delaying or splitting
up their contributions. Assumption-5: An agent’s value for the public project
(θi) is his private information and h
0, T , and ht are common knowledge.
4 Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms
In the class of PPM, an agent’s utility can be stated as follows:
Definition 1. (Un)Funded Utility: In the class of provision point mechanisms,
the (un)funded utility of agent-i is his utility if the target amount is (not) col-
lected and the public project is (not) provisioned.
In the provision point mechanisms we consider, an agent’s funded utility is always
(θi−xi) but mechanisms differ in the unfunded utility. We let IX be an indicator
random variable which takes the value 1 if X is true and 0 otherwise.
4.1 Provision Point Baseline (PPB) Mechanism
In PPB, an agent’s strategy space consists only of contribution to be made,
hence ψi = xi ∀i. His unfunded utility is zero and hence his utility is:
ui(x; θi) = Iχ≥h0 × (θi − xi) + Iχ<h0 × 0 (1)
PPB has been shown to have multiple equilibria, many of which are inefficient
[6]: a result which has been verified empirically too [17].
4.2 Provision Point Mechanism with Refund Bonus (PPR)
In PPR [27], if the funding target is not achieved, the contributions are refunded
and an additional refund bonus is paid to agents who volunteered to contribute.
The refund bonus is xiχ B ∀i where B > 0 is the refund budget specified at the
beginning and is common knowledge among all agents. An agent’s strategy space
in PPR consists only of his contribution, hence ψi = xi ∀i and his utility is:
ui(x; θi) = Iχ≥h0 × (θi − xi) + Iχ<h0 ×
(
xi
χ
B
)
(2)
The set of Pure Strategy Nash equilibria (See Appendix for definition) with PPR
is characterized as follows:
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Theorem 1. [27] Let ϑM∩N > h0 and B > 0. In PPR, the set of PSNE are
{(x∗i ) : x∗i ≤ h
0
B+h0 θi∀i;χ = h0} if B ≤ ϑM∩N − h0. Otherwise the set of PSNE
is empty.
PPR considers a setup where agents decide their contributions simultaneously
without knowledge of contributions made by the other agents: it considers a
simultaneous move game.
4.3 Provision Point Mechanism with Securities (PPS)
In a sequential setting where agents arrive over time and can observe the con-
tributions collected thus far (e.g. civic crowdfunding platforms), the PPS mech-
anism is better suited. In PPS [8], if the funding target is not achieved by the
deadline T , the contributions are refunded and an additional refund bonus is
paid to agents who volunteered to contribute. The refund bonus is designed so
that early contributions are incentivized. PPS uses a complex prediction market
[3] to determine the refund bonus with the key idea being that contributors ac-
tually buy contingent securities (rtii ) which each pay a unit amount if the project
is not funded. An agent’s strategy space in PPS consists of the quantum and
timing of his contribution, hence ψi = (xi, ti) ∀i. Thus, his utility is given as:
ui(ψ; θi) = Iχ≥h0(θi − xi) + Iχ<h0(rtii − xi) (3)
PPS achieves an equilibrium at which the project is funded and thus the refund
bonus is not paid out at equilibrium [8].
4.4 Referral Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms (REPPM)
Similar to PPM, in REPPM too, the project is provisioned only if the collected
funds reach the provision point. If the provision point is not reached, the contri-
butions are refunded and an additional bonus is paid to agents who volunteered
to contribute. This bonus consists of two parts (i) a refund bonus and (ii) a
referral bonus. The refund bonus is calculated using the underlying provision
point mechanism while the referral bonus is calculated using a Referral Bonus
Function (RBF). The referral bonus incentivizes agents to refer other agents to
contribute to the public project. The key intuition in REPPM is to embed a RBF
in provision point mechanisms such that it impacts only the unfunded utility of
agents: since the unfunded utility is realized only if the project is not funded, the
referral bonus is paid out only if the project is not provisioned. Thus, REPPM,
follow a two pronged approach:
1. Design a referral mechanism where a referral bonus is offered but is not paid
out if the project is funded.
2. Intelligently embed the referral mechanisms in provision point mechanisms
so that the public project is funded at equilibrium.
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Advantage of REPPM : To quantify the advantage of REPPM, we first
formalize the notion of social desirability:
Definition 2. (N, τ) Socially Desirable : A public project is said to be (N, τ)
socially desirable if the net value of the project among agents in the set N is
greater than τ , that is, ϑN =
∑n
i=1 θi > τ .
In Figure 2(b), if the cost of P2 were 2, then the project is not socially desirable
without referrals but is socially desirable with referrals. PPR [27] ensures that
the project gets funded at equilibrium if it is (M ∩N,h0) socially desirable. In
a sequential setting, PPS [8] ensures that the project gets funded at equilibrium
if it is (M ∩ N,C−10 (h0 + C0(0))) socially desirable4. Thus, in both PPR and
PPS mechanisms, the social desirability condition is based on M ∩N . We design
mechanisms that are (N, τ) socially desirable rather than (M ∩ N, τ ′) socially
desirable. We show that this can be achieved if the RBF satisfies the following:
1. RBF-Condition-1 (Continuous and Differentiable) This condition
requires that the gradient of the RBF ( dsdR ) is well defined everywhere so that
the marginal increase in referral bonus due to increase referred contribution
is well defined.
2. RBF-Condition-2 (Monotonically Increasing) This condition requires
that the gradient of the RBF is positive (s′(R) = dsdR > 0 ∀R ∈ R+) so
that an agent has an incentive to refer all agents in his network.
3. RBF-Condition-3 (Bounded Loss) This condition requires that the re-
ferral bonus is upper bounded (s(R) < σ ∀R ∈ R+) so that the loss of the
sponsor is upper bounded. To this end, we will required that d
2s
dR2 ≤ 0 ∀R.
Finally, if an agent does not refer, the agent does not get any referral bonus
(s(0) = 0) so that in the absence of referrals, the mechanism reduces to the
underlying provision point mechanism. Though this is not strictly required, it
makes the analysis simpler. Some examples of functions that can be used as
RBF are tanh(R),
(
1
1+exp(−R) − 0.5
)
and 2pi arctan(R). The choice among these
depends on the minimum bonus that needs to be offered to incentivize referrals.
We now discuss two instantiations of REPPM.
5 Embedding Referrals in PPR : REPP-R
REPP-R embeds referrals in PPR. Similar to PPR, in REPP-R, the project is
provisioned only if the collected funds reach the provision point. If the provision
point is not reached, the contributions are refunded and an additional bonus is
paid to agents who volunteered to contribute. This bonus consists of two parts
(i) a refund bonus and (ii) a referral bonus. Let XMi =
∑
j∈Mi xj . In REPP-R,
agent-i’s strategy is ψi = (xi, ti,Mi) and he has a utility:
ui(ψ; θi) = Iχ≥h0(θi − xi) + Iχ<h0
(
xi
χ
B + s(XMi)
)
(4)
4 In Section 6, we will explain the C0 function in more detail.
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Comparing Equation (4) with Equation (2), we can observe that the unfunded
utility in REPP-R contains an additional term which depends on the contribu-
tions of agents referred by agent i.
5.1 Impact of Introducing Referral Bonus in PPR
Fig. 3. Some Referral Tree Structures in REPP-S
To understand the impact of introducing referrals in REPP-R, we evaluate the
maximum referral bonus that may need to be paid out: this depends on the RBF
and the structure of the underlying referral tree. We can show (see Appendix)
that the maximum referral bonus needs to be paid out when the provision point
(h0) is achieved by n = |N | contributions of the smallest possible contribution
δ = h
0
n and each contributing agent is referred by a chain of d non-contributing
agents where d is the diameter of the social network of N agents. The maximum
referral bonus paid out is nd× s(δ) < ndσ. Figure 3(b) shows such a worst case
with d = 1 with the sponsor as the root and the shaded nodes indicating agents
who did not contribute.
5.2 Equilibrium Analysis of REPP-R
Theorem 2. Let s() be a referral bonus function that satisfies RBF-Conditions
1-3. If REPP-R is used for crowdfunding a project with provision point h0 when
σ < ϑN−h
0−B
nd , the strategies in the set
{
(ψ∗i = {x∗i , Ni}) : x∗i ≤ min
(
0, θi−σ
1+ B
h0
)
,
otherwise x∗i = 0; χ = h
0)
}
are Nash equilibria.
Proof. First, we claim in Step-0 that it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for all
agents to refer so that M ∩ N = N . In Step 1, we show that, at equilibrium,
χ = h0. In Step 2, we characterize the equilibria strategy of agent i (ψ∗i ). Step 3
proves the upper bound on σ.
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Step 0: RBF-Conditions-1,2,3 ensure that every agent has an incentive to
refer since an agent’s unfunded utility increases monotonically with his referrals:
s(XMi) increases monotonically with Mi and is independent of his contribution.
Thus, M ∩N = N .
Step 1: If χ > h0, any agent with a positive contribution can gain in utility by
marginally decreasing his contribution. χ < h0 cannot hold in equilibrium since,
in REPP-R the unfunded utility always increases with contribution (xiχ B).
5 and
ϑN > (ndσ+h
0 +B) > h0 means that there exists at least one agent j ∈ N who
can increase his (unfunded) utility by contributing more so that he get a higher
refund bonus. Thus, in equilibrium χ = h0.
Step 2: Due to Assumption-2, agents do not have any bias in believing whether
the project will be funded, other than the contributions. From Step 1, the con-
tributions would be such that the project is funded in equilibrium. Thus, at
equilibrium, an agent will contribute such that his funded utility is no less than
the highest possible unfunded utility, that is ∀i:
θi − x∗i ≥
x∗i
h0
B + s(X∗Mi) or equivalently x
∗
i ≤
(
θi − s(X∗Mi)
1 + Bh0
)
≤
(
θi − σ
1 + Bh0
)
where the last inequality follows because even if agents are optimistic about
referral bonus and go conservative for xi, s(X
∗
Mi
) ≤ σ (RBF-Condition-3).
Since negative contributions (withdrawals) are not allowed, a negative equilib-
rium contribution means that an agent will refer but not contribute.
Step 3: Summing up
(
θi − x∗i ≥ x
∗
i
h0B + s(X
∗
Mi
)
)
for all agents and using
∑
i∈N s(X
∗
Mi
) ≤
ndσ (See Section 5.1), we get the condition
ϑN − h0 ≥ B +
∑
i∈N
s(X∗Mi) ⇒ σ <
ϑN − h0 −B
nd
Explanation: The upper bound6 on σ has a natural interpretation: if the re-
ferral bonus is higher, it reduces the incentives for an agent to contribute to an
extent that the project does not get funded at equilibrium. In PPR, the condi-
tion for equilibrium is B < (ϑM∩N − h0), that is, the excess value (ϑM∩N − h0)
is used to incentivize contributions. In REPP-R, the excess value has to support
the incentives for contribution and the incentives for referrals (B+ndσ < ϑN−h0
): with the important difference that the excess value is calculated in a larger
pool (N in REPP-R instead of M ∩ N in PPR). This means that in scenarios
where ϑN > ϑM∩N , REPP-R can achieve funding for projects which would not
have been funded with PPR as long as the referral bonus is upper bounded
appropriately.
5 In Step-3, we show that the upper bound on σ ensures that the referral incentives
do not override the incentives to contribute.
6 In theory, no lower bound on referral bonus is needed since any referral incentive,
no matter how small, should incentivize referrals. In practice, a lower bound may
depend on the effort required to contribute.
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6 Embedding Referrals in PPS : REPP-S
REPP-S embeds referrals in PPS [8]. PPS uses a prediction market to determine
the refund bonus with the key idea being that contributors are allotted contin-
gent securities [4] which each pay a unit amount if the project is not funded. The
authors set up a binary prediction market with two outcomes: (i) the project is
funded (ii) the project is not funded. PPS allots securities for the project-not-
funded outcome to agents who contribute. The number of securities associated
with the project-funded outcome is 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. The number of securities al-
lotted to an agent depends on the contribution and timing of his contribution.
To determine the number of securities to allot, PPS leverages a complex predic-
tion market [3] created using a cost function C : R2 → R. To be used in PPS,
a cost function must satisfy the following conditions: (i) Path Independence (ii)
Continuous and Differentiable (iii) Information Incorporation (iv) No arbitrage
(v) Bounded Loss [3,8]. Let qt denote the total number of securities (associated
with project-not-funded outcome) allotted till time t in PPS. The number of
securities allotted to agent i if he contributes xi at time ti is:
rtii = C
−1
0 (xi + C0(q
ti))− qti (5)
where C0 : R → R is a function derived from C by setting the number of the
securities associated with the project-funded outcome to 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ] [8].
In REPP-S, the project is provisioned only if the collected funds reach the
provision point. If the provision point is reached, the contributions are collected
and neither the refund bonus nor the referral bonus is paid. If the provision
point is not reached, the contributions are refunded and an additional bonus is
paid to agents who volunteered to contribute. This bonus consists of two parts
(i) a refund bonus and (ii) a referral bonus : both of these are determined by
an underlying prediction market. For agent-i, the refund bonus depends only
on his contribution and is determined using Equation (5). The referral bonus of
agent-i depends on the number of securities awarded to the agents referred by
him; which, in turn, depends on their quantum and timing of contributions. The
total number of securities allocate to agent i in REPP-S is:
ρi , rtii + s(RMi) (6)
where RMi ,
∑
j∈Mi r
tj
j is the total number of securities allotted to agents
referred by i. We make two key observations (i) RMi depends both on the quanta
of contributions generated due to agent-i’s referrals and the timing of those
contributions: the earlier the referred contributions, the higher the referral bonus
(ii) the securities associated with the refund bonus are allocated at ti as soon as
agent-i contributes but the securities associated with the referrals are allocated
at T to account for any contributions that may come in due to agent-i’s referrals.
In REPP-S, agent-i’s strategy is ψi = (xi, ti,Mi) and he has a utility:
ui(ψ; θi) = Iχ≥h0(θi − xi) + Iχ<h0(ρi − xi) (7)
Comparing Equation (7) with Equation (3) shows how REPP-S differs from PPS
due to the securities allocated for referred contributions.
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6.1 Impact of Introducing Referral Bonus in PPS
To understand the impact of introducing referrals in REPP-S, we evaluate the
maximum referral bonus that may need to be paid out: this depends on the
total number of securities issued which in turn, depends on the cost function
of the prediction market, the referral bonus function and the structure of the
underlying referral tree. With an analysis similar to the REPP-R case, we can
show (see Appendix) that the total number of securities issued is:
qmax =
|M∩N |∑
i=1
ρi =
|M∩N |∑
i=1
(rtii + s(RMi)) < C
−1
0 (h
0 + C0(0)) + ndσ (8)
A higher qmax means lower liquidity in the underlying prediction market and
hence a lower incentive for contribution. In PPS, to ensure that agents contribute
and the project gets funded at equilibrium, an agent’s unfunded utility must be
a monotonically increasing in his contribution. This, in turn, requires that the
cost function must be sufficiently liquid [8]. In REPP-S, ensuring that an agent’s
unfunded utility is monotonically increasing in his contribution requires:
∂
∂xi
(ρi − xi) = ∂
∂xi
(
rtii + s(RMi)− xi
)
> 0 ∀qti ,∀xi < h0
Since s(XMi) is independent of xi and r
ti
i monotonically decreases with q
ti , this
condition translates to:
∂rtii
∂xi
|qmax =
∂
∂xi
(C−10 (xi + C0(qmax))− qmax) > 1 (9)
Equation (8) and Equation (9) determine the total bonus the sponsor must offer
in REPP-S which is higher than in PPS. The advantage of a higher bonus is
an increase in the participant pool and thus a higher likelihood of the project
getting funded which in turn reduces the sponsor’s risk.
6.2 Equilibrium Analysis of REPP-S
Theorem 3. Let C0 be an appropriate cost function and let s() be a RBF that
satisfies RBF-Conditions 1-3. If REPP-S is used for crowdfunding a project
with provision point h0 in a social network of n agents with diameter d and if
σ <
ϑN−C−10 (h0+C0(0))
nd , then the strategies in the set
{
(ψ∗i = {x∗i , ai, Ni}) : x∗i ≤
min(0, (C0(θi − σ + qai) − C0(qai))) if hai > 0, otherwise x∗i = 0; χ = h0
}
are
sub-game perfect equilibria.
Proof. We claim in Step 0 that it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for all agents
to refer so M ∩ N = N . In Step 1, we show that, at equilibrium, χ = h0. In
Step 2, we characterize the equilibria strategy of agent-i. Step 3 proves the upper
bound on σ. We show that these equilibria are sub-game perfect in Step 4.
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Step 0: This is similar to Step 0 of the proof of Theorem 2.
Step 1: In equilibrium, χ > h0 cannot hold since the requester stops collecting
the funds at χ = h0. Since, in REPP-S the unfunded utility always increases
with contribution (See Equation (9)) and ϑN > (ndσ +C
−1
0 (h
0 +C0(0))) > h
0,
χ < h0 mean that there is at least one agent who can increase his unfunded
utility by contributing more and hence at equilibrium χ = h0.
Step 2: Due to Assumption-2, agents do not have any bias in believing whether
the project will be funded, other than the contributions. From Step 1, the con-
tributions would be such that the project is funded in equilibrium. Thus, at
equilibrium, an agent will contribute such that his funded utility is no less than
the highest possible unfunded utility. That is, ρ∗i −x∗i ≤ θi−x∗i or ρ∗i ≤ θi. Using
Equation (5) and Equation (6), we get
C−10 (x
∗
i + C0(q
ti))− qti ≤ θi − s(R∗Mi) or equivalently
x∗i ≤
(
C0
(
θi − s(R∗Mi) + qti
)− C0(qti)) ≤ (C0 (θi − σ + qti)− C0(qti)) (10)
where the last inequality follows from RBF-Condition-3 since s(RMi) ≤ σ ∀i.
Since negative contributions (withdrawals) are not allowed, a negative equilib-
rium contribution means that an agent will refer but not contribute. Now, note
that (i) the RHS of Equation (10) is a monotonically decreasing function of qt
∗
i
and (ii) qt, the number of securities allotted by the market at time t, is a mono-
tonically non-decreasing function of t. Thus, an agent with value θi minimizes
the RHS at t∗i = ai, that is, he contributes as soon as he arrives. Thus, t
∗
i = ai.
Intuitively, if an agent delays his contribution, to be indifferent between funded
and unfunded utility, the agent needs to contribute more.
Step 3: Summing up (ρ∗i − x∗i ≤ θi − x∗i ) for all agents leads to the condition∑n
i=1 ρ
∗
i ≤ ϑN . Using the bound on
∑n
i=1 ρi from Equation (12), we get
σ <
ϑN − C−10 (h0 + C0(0))
nd
(11)
Step 4: These equilibria, specified as a function of the aggregate history (hai), are
also sub-game perfect (See Appendix for definition). Consider agent j who arrives
last at aj . If h
aj = 0, then his best strategy is x∗j = 0. If h
aj > 0, irrespective of
the history of the contributions and haj , his funded and unfunded utility are the
same at x∗j , defined in the theorem and still it is best response for j to follow the
equilibrium strategy. With backward induction, by similar reasoning, it is best
response for every agent to follow the equilibrium strategy, irrespective of the
history, as long as others follow the equilibrium strategy. Further, no agent has
an incentive to delay his contribution either (Assumption-2 and cost of securities
never decreases in REPP-S). Thus, these equilibria are sub-game perfect.
Explanation: In PPS, the condition for equilibrium is ϑM∩N < C−10 (h
0+C0(0))
and the excess value is used to sponsor a prediction market which issues securities
for contributions. In REPP-S, the excess value has to support the incentive for
contribution and the incentives for referrals but the excess value is calculated in
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a larger pool too (N in REPP-S instead of M∩N in PPS). The referral incentives
can be either carved out of the same budget (lower liquidity in the prediction
market) or can be paid out from additional budget (increase in the sponsor’s
budget). Finally, note that PPS is a class of mechanisms. One instantation of
PPS is (Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule)LMSR-PPS and our analysis applies
to the whole class (See Appendix for LMSR -REPPS).
7 Conclusion
We considered civic crowdfunding, formalized the notion of social desirability
of a public project, and proposed Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mecha-
nisms (REPPM), a class of mechanisms that achieve an equilibrium in which
the project gets funded if it is socially desirable among the whole agent popula-
tion. By incentivizing agents to both contribute and refer other agents, REPPM
solves two challenges: (i) agents do not free ride (every agent’s equilibrium strat-
egy is to contribute in proportion to his true value for the project) and (ii)
information about the crowdfunding effort diffuses in the social network so that
agents who have value for the project have an opportunity to contribute. This
arises at the cost of a higher budget that a sponsor must furnish. However,
since neither the referral bonus nor the refund bonus needs to be paid out at
equilibrium, finding a sponsor who offers these incentives is more likely. With
these advantages, our mechanisms can significantly improve the success rate of
civic crowdfunding. Comparing REPPM with the corresponding PPM (Table 1)
Mechanism Equilibrium Contribution Social Desirability Conditions
PPR θi
1+ B
h0
(M ∩N,h0 +B) B ∈ (0, ϑM∩N − h0)
REPP-R min
(
0, θi−σ
1+ B
h0
)
(N,h0 +B + ndσ)) B ∈ (0, ϑN − h0 − ndσ)
PPS C0(θi + q
ai)− C0(qai) (M ∩N,C−10 (h0 + C0(0))) Sufficient Liquidity [8]
REPP-S min(0, (C0(θi − σ + qai)− C0(qai))) (N, (C−10 (h0 + C0(0)) + ndσ)) Equation (9)
LMSR-PPS b ln
(
1+exp
(
θi+q
ai
b
)
1+exp( q
ai
b
)
)
(M ∩N,h0 + b ln 2) b ∈
(
0, ϑM∩N−h
0
ln 2
)
LMSR-REPP-S min
(
0, b ln
(
1+exp
(
θi−σ+qai
b
)
1+exp( q
ai
b
)
))
(N,h0 + b ln 2 + ndσ) b ∈
(
0, ϑN−h
0−ndσ
ln 2
)
Table 1. Key Results
shows that REPPM increases the pool of agents who can contribute, at the cost
of increasing the threshold of social desirability. Thus, they are well suited in
scenarios where the increase in the participant pool can significantly outweigh
the increase in threshold. In web based civic crowdfunding platforms, where
the successful funding of a public project requires a significant effort to attract
contributors and funds, our mechanisms will have a significant impact.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Notation Table
The following table summarizes the notation used in this paper.
Symbol Definition
T Time at which fund collection concludes
t Epoch of time in the interval [0, T ]
ht Amount that remains to be funded at t;
h0 Target amount (provision point)
i ∈ {0, 1, . . .} Agent id; i = 0 refers to the requester
Ni Neighbors of agent i in the social network
Mi Set of contributors referred to by agenti
θi ∈ R+ Agent i’s value for the project
xi ∈ R+ Agent i’s contribution to the project
ai ∈ [0, T ] Time at which agent i arrives at the platform
ti ∈ [ai, T ] Time at which agent i contributes to the project
ψi Strategy of agent i
ϑN ∈ R+ Net value for the project among agent set N
χ ∈ R+ Net contribution for the project
Table 2. Key notation
8.2 Equilibrium Definitions
We seek to design mechanisms in a sequential setting such that a public project
gets funded at equilibrium. Such mechanisms induce a game among the agents
{1, 2, . . . , n}. With ψis being agents’ strategies and uis as their utilities, we define
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) and Sub-Game Perfect Equilibrium
(SGPE).
Definition 3. (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium) A strategy profile ψ∗ = (ψ∗1 , . . . , ψ
∗
n)
is said to be a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) if ∀i,∀θi
ui(ψ
∗
i , ψ
∗
−i; θi) ≥ ui(ψ˜i, ψ∗−i; θi) ∀ψ˜i.
Let Ht be the history of the game till time t, that contains the agents’ arrivals
and their contributions, then we define:
Definition 4. (Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium) A strategy profile ψ∗ = (ψ∗1 , . . . , ψ
∗
n)
is said to be a sub-game perfect equilibrium if ∀i,∀θi
ui(ψ
∗
i , ψ
∗
−i|Hai ; θi) ≥ ui(ψ˜i, ψ∗−i|Hai ; θi) ∀ψ˜i,∀Ht
Here ψ∗−i|Hai indicates that the agents who arrive after ai follow the strategy
specified in ψ∗−i.
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8.3 REPP-R Worst Case Analysis
As the number of referrals needed per unit of contribution increases, more referral
bonus needs to be paid out. Since the exact amount of referral bonus depends
on the referral tree structure, we analyze two possible worst case scenarios.
Case-1: : The provision point (h0) is achieved by n contributions of the small-
est possible contribution δ = h
0
n each - all of them referred by a different agent.
Figure 3(b) shows such an example where the provision point is met by the con-
tribution of agents in the set {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} each one referred by a different
agent. In this example, the contribution is inter-mediated by exactly one referring
agent: in general, the path length between a contributor and the sponsor may
consist of d unique agents who do not contribute - d being the diameter of the
underlying social network. The total referral bonus paid out is nd× s(δ) < ndσ.
Case-2: : The provision point (h0) is achieved by n contributions of the smallest
possible contribution δ = h
0
n each - all of them referred by the same agent. Figure
3(c) shows such an example where the provision point is met by the contribution
of agents in the set {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} all of them referred by 6. In this example,
the contribution is inter-mediated by exactly one referring agent: in general, the
path length between a contributor and the sponsor may consist of d nodes who
monopolize the contributions - d being the diameter of the underlying social
network. The total referral bonus paid out in this case is d× s(nδ) < dσ.
RBF-Condition-3 ensures that the RBF is a concave function so that the
worst case is Case-1.
8.4 REPP-S Worst Case Analysis
Since the amount of referral bonus depends on the referral tree structure, we
analyze two possible (worst case) scenarios.
Case-1: : The provision point is met by the smallest allowed contributions (δ)
and each of these contributions is due to a referral. Thus, the provision point
(h0) is achieved by n contributions of δ = h
0
n each. Figure 3(b) shows such an
example. The total number of securities issued is
∑n
i=1 ρi =
∑n
i=1(r
ti
i + s(RMi))
which can be expressed in terms of the cost function used in the prediction
market and the RBF as:
n−1∑
i=0
(
C−10 (δ + C0(iδ)) + d× s(C−10 (δ + C0(iδ)))
)
= C−10 (h
0 + C0(0)) + d×
n−1∑
j=0
s(C−10 (δ + C0(jδ))))
where the first term follows since the cost function used in the prediction market
is path independent [8]. Since the RBF and cost function are monotonically
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increasing, we also have:
d×
n−1∑
j=0
s(C−10 (δ + C0(jδ)))) ≤ nd× s(C−10 (δ + C0(0))))
Finally, RBF-Condition-3 ensures that nd× s(C−10 (δ + C0(0)))) < ndσ, so:
n−1∑
i=0
(
C−10 (δ + C0(iδ)) + d× s(C−10 (δ + C0(iδ)))
)
< C−10 (h
0 + C0(0)) + ndσ
Case-2: : The provision point is met by the smallest allowed contributions (δ)
and all the contributions are referred by a single agent. Figure 3(c) shows such
an example. The total number of securities issued is:
n−1∑
i=0
(
C−10 (δ + C0(iδ))
)
+ d× s
(
n−1∑
i=0
C−10 (δ + C0(iδ))
)
≤ C−10 (h0 + C0(0)) + dσ
Which of the two cases is applicable in a given scenario depends on the RBF.
Specifically, Case-1 applies when RBF-Condition-3 ensures that the RBF is a
concave function so that
∑n−1
i=0
(
s(C−10 (δ + C0(iδ)))
)
> s
(∑n−1
i=0 C
−1
0 (δ + C0(iδ))
)
and thus the worst case is Case-1.
8.5 LMSR - REPP-S
In a market with a binary outcome event, let the vector of outstanding securi-
ties be (qω0 , qω1). The number of securities associated with the project-funded
outcome (qω1) is 0∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Let qt denote the total number of securities (asso-
ciated with project-not-funded outcome) allotted till time t in PPS. A popular
cost functions that satisfies the conditions to be used in PPS is the LMSR (Log-
arithmic Market Scoring Rule) based cost function [16]:
C(qω0 , qω1) = b ln(exp(qω0/b) + exp(qω1/b))⇒ C0(qt0) = b ln(1 + exp(qt0/b))
where b is a parameter that controls the market liquidity. Applying Equation
(10) for an LMSR based REPP-S, the equilibrium contribution of agent i with
value θi who arrives at ai and refers Mi agents is :
x∗i ≤ b ln
(
1 + exp
(
θi − σ + qai0
b
))
− b ln
(
1 + exp(
qai0
b
)
)
Using Equation (8), the maximum number of securities that can be allocated is:
b ln
(
exp
(
h0
b
+ ln(2)
)
− 1
)
+ nd× s
(
b ln
(
exp
(
δ
b
+ ln(2)
)
− 1
))
< h0 + b ln 2 + ndσ
and applying Equation (11) the condition for a project to be funded at equilib-
rium is:
h0 + b ln 2 + ndσ < ϑN
